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Loading this candidate’s profile from the FEC filings and campaign records.
Where They Stand is a nonpartisan guide to everyone running for Congress: their money, their own words and how incumbents voted. Find your ballot →
Candidates › MA-04 race › 2025–2026
DemocraticU.S. House, MA-04Massachusetts
Has not served in Congress
50 priorities from poulos.house, in the order they are listed there. Every heading and the text under it is copied exactly, as one passage for each page it is from, and links to that place on the page; hover a source to see which passage it opens.
Healthcare is a human right. Workers facing layoffs shouldn't have to worry about losing health insurance. It's time for Medicare-for-all.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
In the richest country in the world, no one should have to choose between paying for medicine and putting food on the table. Yet 27 million Americans remain completely uninsured, and millions more carry insurance policies with deductibles so high that healthcare remains effectively inaccessible when they need it most.1 The United States spends seventeen point eight percent of its gross domestic product on healthcare—approximately twice the average of other high-income countries—yet achieves worse health outcomes measured by life expectancy, infant mortality, and preventable disease burden.1 We spend more and get less, a damning indictment of a system designed to extract profit rather than deliver care.
Even those Americans fortunate enough to possess employer-sponsored insurance live with persistent anxiety. What happens if I lose my job? Workers facing layoffs confront not only lost income but also the terrifying prospect of losing health insurance at precisely the moment when economic stress takes the greatest toll on physical and mental health. This fear keeps people trapped in jobs they hate, prevents entrepreneurship and career mobility, and transforms the employment relationship into a form of coercion where workers cannot freely choose better opportunities.2 Economists call this phenomenon “job lock,” and it undermines both worker welfare and economic efficiency.2
The Failure of Employer-Sponsored Insurance ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/medicare-for-all at this heading)
Approximately one hundred fifty-four million Americans—roughly fifty-six percent of the nonelderly population—receive health insurance through an employer.3 This system ties healthcare access to employment status, creating profound vulnerability during economic disruptions. When workers lose their jobs, they can technically continue coverage through the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, commonly known as COBRA. But COBRA coverage requires unemployed workers to pay the full premium that employers previously subsidized, plus a two percent administrative charge. Monthly COBRA premiums typically range from four hundred to seven hundred dollars per individual, pricing most recently unemployed workers out of continued coverage precisely when they have lost their income.
Research documents the severe effects of tying health insurance to employment. Job lock reduces worker mobility by at least twenty-five percent, and the Affordable Care Act has not significantly improved this situation.2 Being the sole source of health coverage for one’s family associates with twenty-eight percent lower job mobility compared to workers whose partners have employer-sponsored insurance.2 For workers with pre-existing health conditions that could have led to insurance denials before the ACA, employer-sponsored insurance reduces job mobility by up to forty-five percent.2 This immobility undermines labor market efficiency, makes it harder to match workers to suitable jobs, and cuts overall labor productivity.2 People choose jobs or remain stuck in suboptimal employment due to their need for health insurance rather than because those jobs best utilize their skills or provide the most value to the economy.2
The crisis continues to worsen under current policy. If Congress fails to extend enhanced premium tax credits for Affordable Care Act marketplace plans beyond their 2025 expiration, marketplace enrollees will experience an average premium increase of seven hundred five dollars annually, and four million more people will become uninsured.1 The Congressional Budget Office projects the uninsured rate will rise to nine percent by 2034, affecting approximately thirty-two million Americans.1 Younger adults ages nineteen to sixty-five face the harshest impact, with eleven percent completely lacking medical coverage in 2024, compared to just six percent of children who benefit from higher Medicaid enrollment rates.1
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/medicare-for-all
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AI threatens millions of jobs. We need bold solutions—UBI, automation taxes, and collective bargaining—to ensure no one is left behind by technological progress.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
Artificial intelligence is transforming our economy at an unprecedented pace, and millions of American workers stand at risk of being left behind. Goldman Sachs and McKinsey project that approximately 12 million jobs—roughly 7% of the American workforce—could be fully replaced by AI within the next decade.1 Research by economists Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo demonstrates that between 50% and 70% of changes in the U.S. wage structure over the last four decades stem from relative wage declines of worker groups specialized in routine tasks in industries experiencing rapid automation.2
The nature of this technological disruption differs fundamentally from previous waves of automation that primarily affected manufacturing workers. AI will predominantly disrupt knowledge work and professional services. Call center representatives face replacement by conversational AI systems. Clerical staff confront automated document processing. Software developers watch as AI generates code with increasing sophistication—Microsoft and Google already generate nearly 25% of their code using AI agents.1 Consultants and financial analysts see their analytical tasks automated by machine learning algorithms. The geographic impact will prove particularly severe in urban tech hubs like Boston, where these professional occupations concentrate.1
Early warning signs of this transformation already flash red across economic indicators. Recent Federal Reserve analysis documents a troubling correlation: occupations that embraced generative AI most intensively have shown the largest unemployment gains.3 This relationship suggests AI adoption directly displaces workers rather than merely augmenting their capabilities. Research shows that automation doesn’t just boost productivity—it eliminates jobs. When companies replace workers with machines, productivity may increase, but workers lose wages and employment. MIT economists found that industrial robots reduced both jobs and pay in the industries and cities where they were deployed.4
The Inadequacy of Past Policy Responses ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/ai-worker-protection at this heading)
We cannot rely on outdated policy responses that failed workers during previous economic disruptions. Trade Adjustment Assistance, the federal program designed to help workers displaced by foreign competition, helped fewer than 75,000 workers annually even as millions lost manufacturing jobs.1 Those workers who did receive TAA assistance earned 20% below their previous wages after completing retraining programs.1 The program’s failures illuminate why merely expanding existing safety net programs cannot address AI displacement’s scale and speed.
Some policy analysts propose simply requiring more advance notice before mass layoffs by expanding the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.5 While modernizing WARN Act requirements might provide workers additional time to prepare for unemployment, such reforms do not address the fundamental economic transformation AI creates. Requiring 60 or 90 days notice before a layoff does nothing to ensure workers can find comparable employment in an economy where AI has automated their skills.
Congressional Action: What Has Been Proposed ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/ai-worker-protection at this heading)
Congress has begun grappling with these challenges, though legislative action remains nascent. The Workforce of the Future Act of 2024, introduced by Senators Butler and Hirono as S.5031, represents one of the most comprehensive federal responses.6 This bill authorizes the Secretary of Education to increase access to emerging technology education and upskill workers, with specific provisions to mitigate earnings or income losses to demographic groups most vulnerable to career displacement due to artificial intelligence.6 The legislation establishes an AI Workforce Research Hub within the Department of Labor to evaluate AI’s impact on the labor market and develop proactive solutions for job displacement.7
Representative Bonnie Bonamici and Representative Chris Deluzio introduced the No Robot Bosses Act in March 2024, which would protect the humanity and rights of workers during hiring, disciplinary, or firing processes.8 This legislation responds to the rising threat of misuse and abuse of AI technologies in employment decisions, establishing guardrails against algorithmic discrimination and automated management systems that reduce workers to data points.
The Jobs of the Future Act of 2023 directs the Department of Labor and the National Science Foundation to submit a comprehensive report to Congress on AI’s workforce impact, including recommendations to minimize job displacement and identify workforce training needs.7 While a study represents only a first step, systematic analysis must precede effective policy intervention.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/ai-worker-protection
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The BOOST Act would provide $250/month to every adult. When AI eliminates jobs, UBI provides a floor to stand on—funded by those who profit from automation.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
As artificial intelligence transforms our economy and threatens millions of jobs, we need bold solutions that provide economic security regardless of employment status. Universal Basic Income ensures every American has a foundation to stand on when technological change pulls the rug out from under them.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/universal-basic-income
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Without unions, workers face automation alone. The Writers Guild won AI protections through collective power. Pass the PRO Act and give every worker a seat at the table.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
As artificial intelligence transforms workplaces across America, workers face a stark choice: negotiate collectively or face automation alone and powerless. Companies choose when and how to deploy AI, and without union representation, individual workers have no say in whether their job gets automated away.
The Writers Guild Victory Shows the Way ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/collective-bargaining at this heading)
The 2023 Writers Guild strike demonstrated conclusively that workers can successfully negotiate AI protocols when they possess collective power.1 Writers secured contractual protections ensuring:
- AI cannot replace them in the writing process
- AI-generated material does not qualify as “source material” affecting their credits or residuals
- Studios must disclose when AI-generated material is provided to writers1
This victory proves that workers with collective bargaining power can shape how technology transforms their industries rather than simply being displaced by it.
The Crisis of Union Decline ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/collective-bargaining at this heading)
Yet only 6% of private-sector workers currently belong to unions, and AI-exposed sectors show disproportionately low unionization rates.1 This leaves the vast majority of American workers vulnerable to automation decisions made entirely by management without worker input.
Research shows that automation doesn’t just boost productivity—it eliminates jobs. When companies replace workers with machines, productivity may increase, but workers lose wages and employment. MIT economists found that industrial robots reduced both jobs and pay in the industries and cities where they were deployed.2 Without unions, workers have no power to negotiate protections against these harms.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/collective-bargaining
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Americans pay 2-3x more for drugs than other countries. Medicare must negotiate prices for all medications, not just a handful. No one should die because they can't afford their prescriptions.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
One in four Americans report difficulty affording their prescription medications, with many skipping doses, cutting pills in half, or forgoing treatment entirely due to cost.1 These are not abstract statistics—they represent real people choosing between lifesaving medications and rent, between insulin and groceries, between survival and bankruptcy. Meanwhile, pharmaceutical corporations report record profits, executives receive multimillion-dollar compensation packages, and the industry spends nearly $150 million annually on federal lobbying to protect these profits.2
Americans pay two to three times more for prescription drugs than patients in other wealthy countries for identical medications.3 A vial of insulin that costs $300 in the United States sells for $30 in Canada.4 Cancer drugs priced at $10,000 per month in America cost a fraction of that price in Europe.3 This price disparity reflects neither research costs nor drug quality—it reflects pharmaceutical industry market power and political influence that prevent the federal government from negotiating drug prices on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries.
The consequences prove deadly. Approximately 1.3 million Americans annually do not fill prescriptions due to cost.5 Diabetics ration insulin, cancer patients delay chemotherapy, heart disease patients skip medications—all because pharmaceutical corporations prioritize profit maximization over patient survival. Studies estimate that thousands of Americans die each year from inability to afford medications that could have saved their lives.5 This constitutes a moral atrocity enabled by congressional failure to challenge pharmaceutical industry power.
Massachusetts Residents Face Crushing Drug Costs ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/prescription-drug-prices at this heading)
Massachusetts residents, despite living in one of the wealthiest states with extensive health insurance coverage, struggle with prescription drug costs comparable to national averages. Approximately 16% of Massachusetts adults report difficulty affording medications, with higher rates among low-income residents, people of color, and those with chronic conditions requiring multiple prescriptions.6
Massachusetts seniors face particularly acute medication cost burdens. While Medicare Part D provides prescription drug coverage, it includes significant gaps—the notorious “donut hole”—leaving many seniors paying thousands of dollars out of pocket for medications after reaching coverage limits. Massachusetts has one of the highest costs of living in the nation, meaning that medication expenses consume an even larger share of fixed incomes for elderly residents who must also afford housing, food, and utilities.
The Commonwealth’s high concentration of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies creates economic tension around drug pricing policy. While these companies provide jobs and contribute to the state economy, they also aggressively lobby against price controls and negotiate tax incentives from state government. Massachusetts workers employed by pharmaceutical corporations deserve good jobs—but not at the expense of patients who cannot afford medications. We can maintain biopharmaceutical employment while demanding that corporations price drugs affordably.
Massachusetts has attempted state-level responses, including prescription drug transparency laws requiring manufacturers to justify price increases.7 However, state action proves insufficient without federal policy. The pharmaceutical industry operates nationally and internationally; only federal intervention through Medicare negotiation and price controls can effectively constrain drug costs. Massachusetts representatives must champion federal legislation rather than accepting pharmaceutical industry campaign contributions and echoing corporate talking points against negotiation.
The Inflation Reduction Act: Progress and Limitations ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/prescription-drug-prices at this heading)
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 included historic drug pricing provisions that, for the first time, authorized Medicare to negotiate prices for certain prescription drugs.8 This represented significant progress after decades of pharmaceutical industry success in blocking negotiation authority. The legislation caps out-of-pocket Medicare Part D spending at $2,000 annually beginning in 2025, limits monthly insulin costs to $35 for Medicare beneficiaries, requires manufacturers to pay rebates if drug prices rise faster than inflation, and permits Medicare to negotiate prices for a limited number of high-cost drugs.8
However, the Inflation Reduction Act’s drug pricing provisions remain far too modest. Medicare can initially negotiate prices for only 10 drugs in 2026, expanding to 20 drugs by 2029.8 These limitations mean the vast majority of prescription medications remain exempt from negotiation. Pharmaceutical corporations maintain monopoly pricing power for thousands of drugs, continuing to extract maximum profits from captive patients who face the choice between paying extortionate prices or foregoing treatment.
The $35 monthly insulin cap applies only to Medicare beneficiaries, excluding millions of Americans under age 65 who also struggle with insulin costs. The out-of-pocket spending cap similarly applies only to Medicare Part D, leaving those with employer-sponsored insurance or Affordable Care Act marketplace plans facing potentially unlimited medication costs. These eligibility limitations reflect political compromise rather than policy logic—if capping insulin costs makes sense for seniors, it makes equal sense for younger diabetics.
Republican attacks on the Inflation Reduction Act’s drug pricing provisions demonstrate pharmaceutical industry political power. GOP legislators have introduced bills to repeal negotiation authority, weaken price controls, and expand exemptions for specific drug categories.2 The recent Republican rollback delivered $8.8 billion in savings to pharmaceutical corporations by exempting categories of high-cost drugs from negotiation.2 Every exemption protects corporate profits at patients’ expense, illustrating how campaign contributions and lobbying translate directly into legislative outcomes favoring industry over constituents.
We Need Aggressive Federal Intervention ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/prescription-drug-prices at this heading)
Congress should dramatically expand Medicare’s drug price negotiation authority, reject pharmaceutical industry campaign contributions, and implement comprehensive price controls protecting all Americans from medication costs.
Reject Pharmaceutical Industry Money and Influence ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/prescription-drug-prices at this heading)
Massachusetts congressional representatives must refuse pharmaceutical industry campaign contributions and commit to supporting maximum drug price negotiation. The correlation between accepting pharmaceutical money and opposing price controls proves too consistent to dismiss as coincidence. Representatives who accept industry contributions reliably echo industry talking points about innovation, research costs, and negotiation dangers—arguments that dissolve under factual scrutiny but serve corporate profit interests.
Senator Elizabeth Warren has championed aggressive drug pricing legislation throughout her Senate tenure.11 Senator Ed Markey similarly supports strong price negotiation authority. Representative Ayanna Pressley has advocated for drug price controls as a health equity issue. However, Representative Jake Auchincloss accepted pharmaceutical industry contributions and opposed strong negotiation provisions, disqualifying himself from credibly claiming to fight for affordable healthcare.12
Massachusetts voters must demand that congressional candidates reject pharmaceutical money entirely and pledge to support maximum negotiation authority, importation, international reference pricing, and all other measures to lower drug costs. Any representative who accepts pharmaceutical industry contributions has already chosen whose interests they serve—and it is not patients struggling to afford medications.
The pharmaceutical industry will claim that aggressive price controls would eliminate innovation, reduce drug development, and ultimately harm patients by preventing new treatments. These scare tactics have succeeded for decades in blocking reform. However, the evidence contradicts industry claims. Countries with strong price controls continue to benefit from pharmaceutical innovation. National Institutes of Health funding drives most basic research underlying new drugs. Pharmaceutical companies spend more on marketing and executive compensation than research. The industry remains highly profitable even in countries with aggressive price negotiation.13
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/prescription-drug-prices
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$1.6 trillion in student debt crushes economic mobility and perpetuates racial wealth inequality. We need to cancel all federal student debt and make public college tuition-free.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
Forty-three million Americans collectively owe $1.6 trillion in federal student loan debt, a burden that crushes economic mobility, delays homeownership, prevents family formation, and traps borrowers in decades of financial precarity.1 The average borrower owes approximately $37,000, but many owe far more—particularly graduate students and those who attended for-profit colleges that delivered worthless credentials while extracting maximum tuition.1 This debt crisis did not emerge by accident. It resulted from deliberate policy choices: decades of state disinvestment in public higher education, federal failure to regulate predatory lending and for-profit colleges, and a political consensus that treated education as a private investment rather than a public good.
The economic consequences extend far beyond individual borrowers. Student debt suppresses consumer spending, reducing economic growth. It prevents young workers from starting businesses, buying homes, or investing in their communities. It forces people to delay having children or forgo parenthood entirely due to financial insecurity. For millions of Americans, student debt represents a permanent sentence of economic precarity imposed in exchange for accessing the education our economy demands as a prerequisite for middle-class employment.
The Crisis Is Getting Worse ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/student-debt-cancellation at this heading)
The Trump administration has made clear that it intends to punish rather than help student loan borrowers. In December 2025, the Department of Education announced it will begin garnishing wages of borrowers in default, with notices going out starting January 2026.2 The administration has eliminated the SAVE Plan—an income-driven repayment program that provided affordable payments for millions of low-income borrowers—and transferred approximately 7 million enrolled borrowers to other plans with less favorable terms.3
Currently, more than 12 million borrowers—over 25 percent of all student loan borrowers—are in delinquency or default.3 Rather than helping these struggling Americans access affordable repayment options, the administration has chosen aggressive collection tactics: garnishing wages, seizing tax refunds, and intercepting federal payments. The Student Borrower Protection Center has called this approach “cruel, unnecessary, and irresponsible.”2
This punitive approach does nothing to address the underlying crisis. Garnishing wages from people who already cannot afford their payments does not magically create ability to pay—it simply pushes struggling families deeper into poverty while enriching debt collectors. Meanwhile, the administration has proposed gutting federal student aid programs to help fund tax cuts for the wealthy, ensuring that future students face even higher debt burdens than current borrowers.4
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/student-debt-cancellation
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Wall Street hedge funds are buying up homes and driving up prices. We need federal action to ban hedge funds from purchasing single-family homes and restore housing as a right, not a commodity.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
Massachusetts faces one of the most severe housing affordability crises in the nation. The median home price in the Commonwealth has soared to $625,000, placing homeownership far out of reach for working families.1 In the 4th Congressional District—spanning Newton, Brookline, Fall River, Taunton, Attleboro, and surrounding communities—the crisis takes different forms but affects residents across all income levels.
In Newton, the median home price has reached $1.57 million.2 In Brookline, it’s $1.2 million.2 Even in traditionally more affordable communities like Fall River ($521,000), Taunton ($555,000), and Attleboro ($500,000), housing costs have become unsustainable for working families.2 Renters face similarly dire circumstances: the fair market rent for a two-bedroom apartment in the Boston metro area is $2,415 per month, requiring an annual income of $96,600 to afford—nearly double the median renter income.3
This crisis is not an accident. It is the result of decades of policy choices that have allowed Wall Street to treat housing as a commodity for speculation rather than protecting it as a fundamental human right.
Wall Street’s Role in the Housing Crisis ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/affordable-housing at this heading)
Following the 2008 financial crisis, corporate investors seized the opportunity to buy up single-family homes at low prices. What began as opportunistic purchases has become a systematic financialization of American housing. Private equity firms, hedge funds, and institutional investors now control hundreds of thousands of homes nationwide, extracting wealth from communities while driving up prices and rents.
In Massachusetts alone, corporate investors purchased 6,600 single-family homes in 2021, or 9% of all sales.4 These purchases disproportionately target working-class communities and communities of color, where investors can buy properties, raise rents, and flip homes for profit. The impact extends beyond direct purchases: when investors buy up available housing stock, they reduce supply for families trying to buy their first home, driving up prices across entire markets.
These Wall Street landlords operate differently than traditional landlords. They use algorithms to maximize rent increases, employ aggressive eviction tactics, and defer maintenance to boost profits. They bundle these properties into complex financial instruments—similar to the mortgage-backed securities that triggered the 2008 crisis—allowing speculation on housing to occur multiple times over.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/affordable-housing
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Women and minority entrepreneurs face systematic barriers to capital. We need postal banking, public banks, and stronger fair lending enforcement to ensure every entrepreneur gets a fair shot.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
The credit gap for women and minority small business owners is not an accident — it reflects decades of deliberate discrimination and structural barriers in our financial system. In 2023, only 45% of women-owned businesses were fully approved for the loan amounts they requested, compared to 55% of men-owned businesses.1 Twenty-five percent of women are denied business loans entirely, versus 19% of men.1 The disparities are even starker for minority entrepreneurs: just 41% of startups owned by people of color are considered low credit risk, and firms owned by people of color are far less likely to have paid professionals in their networks who can help them navigate the lending process.2
These gaps are the product of a financial system that was designed to exclude women and people of color from building wealth. Before the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, lenders routinely and explicitly discriminated against women, discounting married women’s income and denying single women credit entirely.3 Even after ECOA passed, Congress had to amend it in 1976 to prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, and age.3
The legacy of redlining compounds these barriers. From 1934 to 1962, the Federal Housing Administration backed $120 billion in mortgages, but fewer than 2% went to people of color.4 The FHA systematically excluded Black families from government-backed loans, confining them to neighborhoods that banks then refused to serve.4 Today, over 74% of white residents own homes compared to just 46% of Black residents, and the typical homeowner in a formerly redlined neighborhood has gained $212,000 less in wealth from property appreciation over the past four decades.5 On average, Black families have $23 for every $100 of white family wealth.5 This wealth gap translates directly into a credit gap: entrepreneurs with less collateral and smaller networks face steeper barriers to financing their businesses.
Postal Banking ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/credit-access at this heading)
Addressing the credit gap requires providing alternatives to a private banking system that has abandoned underserved communities. Ninety-three percent of bank branches that closed since 2008 were in neighborhoods where the median income is below the national average.6 An estimated 5.9 million American households are completely unbanked, and another 18.7 million are underbanked, often relying on predatory payday lenders that extract billions in fees from the poorest Americans.6
The United States already solved this problem once. From 1911 to 1967, the Postal Savings System provided affordable banking services through post offices nationwide.7 The system was especially popular with immigrants and working-class Americans who struggled to find honest banking options. During the Great Depression, when private banks failed, the Postal Savings System remained a safe haven—by 1947, more than 4 million people had $3.4 billion in savings across 8,000 postal units.7
I support reviving postal banking through the Postal Banking Act, introduced by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand and Senator Bernie Sanders.6 The legislation would allow the United States Postal Service to offer basic financial services including checking and savings accounts, small-dollar loans, and bill payment services. With over 30,000 retail locations—the world’s largest retail network—the USPS can reach communities that private banks have abandoned.6 Polling shows postal banking enjoys 74% support among all voters, including 67% of Republicans.6 The USPS Office of Inspector General has estimated postal banking could generate nearly $9 billion in annual revenue while serving millions of currently unbanked Americans.6
Public Banking ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/credit-access at this heading)
Beyond postal banking, I support establishing public banks at the state and federal level. Public banks operate without the profit motive that leads private lenders to discriminate or avoid communities they deem insufficiently profitable.
The Bank of North Dakota has demonstrated for over a century that public banking works. Founded in 1919 by a farmer protest movement, the bank has turned a profit every year since its founding and has returned over $1 billion to North Dakota’s general fund.8 During the Great Depression, while teachers across the country were being paid in IOUs typically redeemed at a 15% loss, the Bank of North Dakota paid them in full.8 Today, the bank reports assets of $10.8 billion and a return on investment of 15.8%—outperforming Wall Street giants.8
The Bank of North Dakota succeeds by partnering with community banks rather than competing with them. It functions as a “bankers bank,” spreading risk and enabling small local institutions to punch above their weight.8 North Dakota leads the country in community banks per capita, and during the pandemic, the state distributed more federal Paycheck Protection Program loans per capita than any other.8
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/credit-access
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A CEO earning $30 million pays the same Social Security tax as someone making $176,100. The Social Security Expansion Act would boost benefits by $2,400/year by making billionaires pay their fair share.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
Social Security represents the most successful anti-poverty program in American history. In 2021 alone, it lifted 26.3 million Americans out of poverty, including 18.3 million seniors who would otherwise face destitution in their final years.1 For nearly nine decades, this program has embodied a simple promise: if you work hard and contribute throughout your career, you will have dignity and security in retirement. Yet today, that promise is under assault from Republicans who seek to cut benefits while billionaires pay a smaller share of their income into the system than working-class Americans.
The average Social Security benefit is just $1,688 per month—barely $20,000 per year.2 For millions of seniors, this modest sum represents the difference between survival and catastrophe. Nearly 40 percent of seniors rely on Social Security for the majority of their income, and one in seven depend on it for more than 90 percent of what they have to live on.2 These are not abstractions. These are grandparents choosing between medications and groceries, widows stretching pennies to keep the heat on, retired workers who spent decades contributing to our economy now struggling to afford basic necessities in the richest country on Earth.
The situation grows more alarming when we examine retirement preparedness across the broader population. Nearly half of Americans aged 55 and older have no retirement savings whatsoever.2 For these workers approaching their final working years, Social Security will not supplement other income sources—it will be all they have. As pensions have disappeared and 401(k) plans have proven inadequate for most workers, Social Security has become the last remaining pillar of retirement security for the American middle class.
The Billionaire Loophole ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/social-security-expansion at this heading)
The Social Security system contains a fundamental inequity that most Americans do not realize exists. In 2025, workers pay Social Security payroll taxes only on their first $176,100 in earnings.3 Every dollar earned above that cap escapes taxation entirely. This means a nurse earning $80,000 pays Social Security tax on every dollar of their income, while a hedge fund manager earning $30 million pays the same flat amount as someone making $176,100—and nothing on the remaining $29.8 million.
This regressive structure means that the wealthiest Americans pay the lowest effective Social Security tax rates. A CEO earning $30 million pays an effective rate of just 0.04 percent of total income into Social Security, while their secretary pays 6.2 percent on every dollar. The program that protects working families is funded disproportionately by working families, while those who have benefited most from the American economy contribute the least relative to their means.
Some defend this arrangement by arguing that wealthy people don’t draw on Social Security, or that because benefits are capped, taxes should be capped too. Both arguments misunderstand what Social Security is. This is not a personal retirement account where you get back what you put in—it is social insurance. We all benefit from living in a society where seniors are not destitute, where elderly parents do not become financial burdens on their working children, and where consumer spending by retirees supports businesses and jobs throughout the economy. The wealthy benefit enormously from this stability, even if they never cash a Social Security check themselves. As for the benefit cap: Medicare has no earnings cap—high earners pay 1.45 percent on every dollar plus an additional 0.9 percent on income above $200,000. If uncapped taxation is appropriate for Medicare, there is no principled reason Social Security should be different.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/social-security-expansion
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For 40 years, 80% of federal transportation funding has gone to highways while transit-dependent communities are left behind. We need fare-free buses, commuter rail expansion, and equal transit funding.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
For decades, southeastern Massachusetts has been left behind by federal transportation policy. While Boston and its immediate suburbs benefit from extensive MBTA subway, bus, and commuter rail networks, working families in Fall River, Taunton, Attleboro, Milford, and dozens of smaller towns face a different reality. Limited bus service runs only during business hours. Commuter rail stations remain miles away. Workers without cars cannot reliably reach jobs, medical appointments, or educational opportunities. This transportation poverty traps communities in cycles of economic isolation while federal highway dollars flow to projects that primarily benefit wealthier suburbs.
The numbers reveal a systemic failure. Since 1982, roughly 80 percent of federal surface transportation funding has been allocated to highways, while only 20 percent has gone to public transit.1 In 2023, the federal highway program received $68.9 billion compared to just $16.9 billion for the Federal Transit Administration.2 This four-to-one disparity has shaped American communities for generations, subsidizing suburban sprawl while starving the transit systems that working families depend on.
Massachusetts has made progress despite federal neglect. The South Coast Rail project, which began service on March 24, 2025, restored passenger rail to Fall River, New Bedford, and Taunton for the first time in 65 years.3 This $1 billion investment connects southeastern cities to Boston’s job market and represents a historic achievement. But the project was funded entirely by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts without federal support, and the planned Full Build extension still lacks identified funding.3 Meanwhile, towns like Milford, Bellingham, Hopedale, and Mendon remain disconnected from commuter rail despite the existence of the Milford Secondary freight line that could support passenger service.
The transit funding gap has consequences measured in human terms. Workers in Fall River—the largest city in the Fourth Congressional District—face commutes of ninety minutes or more to reach employment centers in Boston or Providence. Seniors without cars cannot access medical specialists. Young people in towns like Norton, Seekonk, and Rehoboth cannot reach community colleges or job training programs without relying on family members for rides. The lack of transit infrastructure limits economic opportunity and reinforces patterns of regional inequality that have persisted for decades.
The Transit Fiscal Cliff ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/public-transit at this heading)
Transit agencies across the country face an immediate crisis. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress provided emergency relief funds that kept buses and trains running as ridership collapsed. Those funds have now been almost entirely obligated—the American Public Transportation Association found that agencies had spent more than 99 percent of federal COVID relief by mid-2023.4 Without new federal support, transit agencies face what experts call a “fiscal cliff”: sudden budget shortfalls that will force service cuts, fare increases, and layoffs.
The scale of the problem is staggering. Ridership dropped to 4.5 billion trips in 2021 and has recovered to only about 7.7 billion trips—still well below pre-pandemic levels.5 Fare revenue fell from $20 billion in 2019 to roughly $10 billion in 2023, adjusted for inflation.4 Transit agencies cannot simply cut their way out of this crisis without devastating the communities that depend on them.
The current federal funding structure makes the problem worse. Since 1998, federal transit funds can only be used for capital projects like purchasing new buses or building stations.4 Agencies cannot use Federal Transit Administration formula funds for operating expenses—the drivers, fuel, and maintenance that actually keep service running. An agency might have federal dollars sitting unused while it lacks the operating funds to put buses on the street. This restriction made little sense when it was enacted, and it makes no sense now as agencies struggle to maintain basic service.
Federal Legislation to Expand Transit ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/public-transit at this heading)
Progressive members of Congress have introduced legislation that would transform public transportation funding and directly benefit underserved communities in southeastern Massachusetts.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/public-transit
Heading as listed on poulos.house ↗ (opens poulos.house at this heading)
The top 0.1% have tripled their share of wealth since the 1970s while paying lower tax rates than working families. It's time for a wealth tax, higher marginal rates, and an end to billionaire tax avoidance.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
The United States has created more billionaires than any country in history while allowing them to pay lower effective tax rates than teachers, nurses, and firefighters. This is not an accident of economics—it is a policy choice. For decades, Congress has slashed top marginal rates, created loopholes for investment income, and starved the IRS of enforcement resources. The result is a system where working families fund the government while billionaires accumulate dynastic wealth largely untouched by taxation.
The numbers are staggering. According to economists Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman at UC Berkeley, the richest 0.1 percent of Americans have seen their share of national wealth triple from 7 percent in the late 1970s to over 20 percent today.12 Meanwhile, the bottom 90 percent has seen its share plummet from 35 percent to just 25 percent over the same period. This concentration of wealth at the top has reshaped American society, distorting our politics, hollowing out the middle class, and undermining the basic promise that hard work leads to prosperity.
The wealthiest Americans do not accumulate this wealth through income that gets taxed like a paycheck. They build fortunes through stock appreciation, real estate holdings, and business ownership—assets that are never taxed until sold, and often never sold at all. When they need cash, they simply borrow against their assets, accessing billions in spending money without triggering a single dollar in capital gains taxes.
A History of Higher Rates ↗ (opens poulos.house/issues/billionaire-tax at this heading)
The argument that taxing the wealthy at higher rates would destroy the economy is contradicted by American history. During the Eisenhower administration—a period many conservatives remember fondly for its economic prosperity—the top marginal income tax rate exceeded 90 percent.3 This was not an aberration. From the mid-1940s through the mid-1960s, top marginal rates remained above 90 percent, and the economy boomed. The middle class expanded dramatically, wages rose steadily, and massive infrastructure investments transformed the nation.
The 91 percent rate during the Eisenhower years applied only to income above approximately $200,000—equivalent to roughly $2 million in today’s dollars. Most wealthy Americans did not pay this full rate due to deductions and other provisions, but the high marginal rate served a crucial function: it discouraged the extreme accumulation of personal wealth and encouraged corporations to reinvest profits into their businesses and employees rather than extracting massive executive payouts.
Since the Reagan administration began slashing top rates in 1981, we have witnessed a dramatic transfer of wealth from working families to the very top.4 The top marginal rate fell from 70 percent to just 28 percent by 1988. It has fluctuated since then but remains at 37 percent today—less than half what it was during the post-war economic boom. This collapse in top rates coincides precisely with the explosion in wealth inequality documented by economists.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/billionaire-tax
Heading as listed on poulos.house ↗ (opens poulos.house at this heading)
When companies replace workers with robots, they should pay taxes to fund social investment. If a robot takes your job, the company should fund your future.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house
When companies replace human workers with AI and automation, they boost their profits while workers lose their livelihoods. Rather than forcing individual workers to absorb the costs of technological displacement, we must tax corporate AI beneficiaries to fund the social investments our communities need.
source ↗ (opens the page at this passage) · poulos.house/issues/corporate-automation-tax
Heading as listed on poulos.house ↗ (opens poulos.house at this heading)
FEC filings, Nov 5, 2025 to Sep 30, 2026 · Official FEC bulk data · committee C00925479
100¢ of every dollar raised has been spent across 4 reports ($81.8K of $82.1K). Cash on hand went from $707 on Mar 31, 2026 to $348 on Sep 30, 2026.
| Report | Raised in the period | Spent in the period | Cash on hand at its close |
|---|---|---|---|
| APRIL QUARTERLY 2026 through Mar 31, 2026 | $9,139 | $8,432 | $707 |
| JULY QUARTERLY 2026 through Jun 30, 2026 | $32,098 | $12,357 | $20,448 |
| PRE-PRIMARY 2026 through Aug 12, 2026 | $27,177 | $36,196 | $11,430 |
| OCTOBER QUARTERLY 2026 through Sep 30, 2026 | $13,728 | $24,810 | $348 |
Each report’s own period, as filed with the FEC; a report filed again counts once, as its latest copy.
No endorsers named
Not yet called · 98% reporting · Full results ↗
Every contest for this seat that named this candidate, most recent last; a result is shown once the race is called. Election dates and results from civicAPI (civicapi.org). civicAPI aggregates results from Secretaries of State and equivalent election bodies, and makes its own race calls. civicapi.org ↗
Official FEC filing record for the current cycle. The priorities they publish are quoted from their own site, in their order.
Statements are quoted from these pages exactly. Headings, order and wording are the campaign’s; the record marking is ours.
A donor who gave several times appears once. The 12 largest donors by total given are listed. In all, 79 itemized contributions were filed this cycle, totaling $46.2K.
Total reported receipts $82,143
Every dollar the committee reported receiving this cycle, split by the source the FEC filing attributes it to. Open a source marked + to see who gave. FEC filings through Sep 30, 2026.
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Tap or hover over a state, or focus the map and use the arrow keys, to read its total. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll to zoom.
83% of the money placed by state came from inside Massachusetts: $38.2K of $46.2K.
| Name | Amount |
|---|---|
| 70 contributions · 83% | $38,214 |
| 2 contributions · 9.7% | $4,500 |
| 4 contributions · 4.3% | $2,000 |
| 2 contributions · 2.7% | $1,250 |
| 1 contribution · 0.5% | $250 |
By the state each donor wrote on the filing, across 5 states and territories. Donors who have given $200 or less this cycle are not itemized, so they cannot be placed on a map. The FEC’s grouping also counts joint-fundraising memo lines, so these rows can add up to more than the itemized total.
| Employer as filed | Amount |
|---|---|
| Written instead of an employer · 25 contributions · 29% of ranked | $13,299 |
| Written instead of an employer · 16 contributions · 21% of ranked | $9,650 |
| 2 contributions · 9.7% of ranked | $4,500 |
| 2 contributions · 7.6% of ranked | $3,500 |
| 1 contribution · 7.6% of ranked | $3,500 |
| 1 contribution · 7.6% of ranked | $3,500 |
| 4 contributions · 3.8% of ranked | $1,750 |
| 1 contribution · 2.2% of ranked | $1,000 |
Itemized gifts over $200, grouped by the words donors filed: not an industry classification, and a gift from an employee is not a gift from the employer. The FEC’s grouping also counts joint-fundraising memo lines, so these rows can add up to more than the itemized total. Gifts of $200 or less ($29,636) are not itemized, so no employer or occupation is filed for them.
Money groups spent on their own, not through a campaign. Each ad is filed against the candidate it names, so money attacking an opponent shows on the opponent’s row. Open a candidate to see who spent it.
The campaign also refunded $100 in contributions, which the categories below do not include.
Total itemized disbursements $71,253
Every itemized payment the committee reported this cycle, sorted by what it said each one was for. The categories are ours; the wording they are matched against is the committee’s own. Open a category to read the filed descriptions and who was paid. FEC filings through Sep 30, 2026.
All 185 itemized payments filed this cycle. Spending below the itemization threshold is not filed line by line.
| Name | Amount |
|---|---|
| 16 payments · 16% of all spending | $13,337 |
| 19 payments · 14% of all spending | $11,383 |
| 30 payments · 13% of all spending | $10,728 |
| 35 payments · 13% of all spending | $10,227 |
| 3 payments · 9.7% of all spending | $7,947 |
| 13 payments · 8.8% of all spending | $7,166 |
| 29 payments · 5.1% of all spending | $4,197 |
| 6 payments · 2.6% of all spending | $2,090 |
The people, firms and committees paid the most, across every kind of payment. Each share is of everything the committee reported spending this cycle, not only the itemized payments above. A payee that is itself a committee links to its own profile.
| Occupation as filed | Amount |
|---|---|
| Written instead of an occupation · 16 contributions · 21% of ranked | $9,650 |
| Written instead of an occupation · 16 contributions · 16% of ranked | $7,299 |
| 4 contributions · 9.8% of ranked | $4,550 |
| 2 contributions · 9.7% of ranked | $4,500 |
| 5 contributions · 9.2% of ranked | $4,250 |
| 1 contribution · 7.6% of ranked | $3,500 |
| 1 contribution · 7.6% of ranked | $3,500 |
| 4 contributions · 3.8% of ranked | $1,750 |
Itemized gifts over $200, grouped by the words donors filed: not an industry classification, and a gift from an employee is not a gift from the employer. The FEC’s grouping also counts joint-fundraising memo lines, so these rows can add up to more than the itemized total. Gifts of $200 or less ($29,636) are not itemized, so no employer or occupation is filed for them.